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Abstract: We consider a variant of the wholesale price-only contract in a simple supply chain consisting of one 
manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. In 
our model, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price first, and then the retailer chooses his order quantity 
before the stochastic demand is realized but postpones his pricing decision until after the realization of demand. 
The existing literature on this model has established structural results under restrictive conditions.  In this study, 
we show that the optimal policies are unique and profit functions are unimodal for both manufacturer and retailer 
under mild conditions on the demand distribution. We consider both multiplicative and additive demand models. 
Insights are developed from analyzing the structures of the optimal policies. Our results contribute as well as 
generalize the existing results in the literature.  
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1.   Introduction  
Understanding the mechanisms of different contracts is one of the main aspects of supply chain 
management in today’s businesses. Many of these contracts are aiming to coordinate the actions of 
different partners to achieve higher supply chain performance; the examples are buyback contract, 
revenue sharing contract, quantity flexibility contract, etc.  However, some contracts that do not 
coordinate the channel are also widely studied in supply chain literature −  wholesale price-only 
contract is one of those.  For example, Lariviere and Porteus (2001) point out, “Given the complexity of 
supply chains, price-only contracts may owe their popularity to their simplicity”. Similarly, on page 238, 
Cachon (2003) states that, “Even though the wholesale-price contract does not coordinate the supply 
chain, the wholesale-price contract is worth studying because it is commonly observed in practice”.   
In this paper, we consider a variant of the wholesale price-only contract in a simple supply chain 
consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, wherein the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and 
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the retailer is the follower. In our model, the manufacturer decides her wholesale price first, and then the 
retailer chooses his order quantity before the stochastic demand is realized but postpones his pricing 
decision until after the realization of demand. In the literature (e.g., Van Mieghem and Dada 1999, 
Granot and Yin 2008), this is coined the price-postponement model.  
To mitigate the effect of demand uncertainty and be flexible enough to offer a broad range of 
products, postponement strategies have recently become a popular business concept that are used in 
many supply chains. There are four types of postponement strategies, namely, pull postponement, 
logistics postponement, form postponement and price postponement (see Cheng et al. (2010) for the 
details on each of these strategies). The first three strategies are also referred to as the production 
postponement (Van Mieghem and Dada 1999). Based on the observations of Van Mieghem and Dada, 
one advantage of the price postponement strategy over the production postponement strategy is that it 
makes capacity investment and production (inventory) decisions relatively insensitive to demand 
uncertainty, since profit margin can be covered by suitably charging the selling price after demand is 
realized. Thus, price postponement can help to reduce market risks while taking other strategic and 
tactical decisions before the realization of stochastic demand. In some manufacturing contexts, marginal 
costs of production may increase under production postponement due to the requirement of faster 
response time once production starts. In such a case, price postponement may be preferred over the 
production postponement. Another advantage of price postponement is its ease of implementation. 
Unlike the production postponement strategy, that requires re-engineering techniques such as operations 
reversal and standardization of product and process, price postponement is a managerial decision that is 
determined by marketing managers. 
Realistic variations of price postponement strategies are used by GreatModels.com, an online retail 
store selling many items such as books, accessories, decals, airbrush, compressors, and scale models of 
aircrafts, helicopters, missiles, ships, cars, etc. (Granot and Yin 2008). This retailer determines or 
readjusts the price of an item after demand information from pre-orders is observed. As an example of 
price postponement strategy, Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) mentions the case of an automobile 
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dealership who must decide on the number of cars to stock before market demand is known. Then, the 
selling price can be negotiated with the customers during the sales. Another realistic variation of price 
postponement strategy was used by Bank of China (BOC) Hong Kong in July 2002. In the face of high 
demand uncertainty, BOC set an initial public offering price range, between HK$6.93 and HK$9.5 per 
share, for investors to subscribe to its shares. Since the public offering was over-subscribed by 26 times, 
BOC finally allotted at least 500 shares to each investor at a price of HK$8.5 (Cheng et al. 2010). It is 
quite possible that similar strategy of offering a price range initially and then, after observing the market 
demand, adjusting the “final” price later, could very well be used for expensive products such as 
aircrafts, ships, missiles, cars, etc. These examples show the potential applications of the price 
postponement strategy. As the postponement strategies are becoming more and more popular day by 
day with the advancement of information technology, and since the price postponement strategy has 
multiple benefits as mentioned above, it is worthwhile to study this strategy in some detail. Moreover, 
wholesale price-only contract is the one which is most popular and commonly used in practice 
(Lariviere and Porteus 2001, Cachon 2003), yet theoretical results are far from complete for this case as 
can be seen from the limited results available in the literature so far (see, e.g., Granot and Yin 2008). 
Therefore, it is important for researchers to investigate the combined model of price postponement 
strategy under the wholesale price-only contract.  
In our study of the price-postponement model, for the multiplicative demand case, we establish the 
unimodality of the expected profit functions of both manufacturer and retailer, and derive the unique 
optimal wholesale price (w) and retail order quantity (Q) under mild conditions on the demand 
distribution. Specifically, for the linear demand function, the condition on the probability distribution is 
either IGFR (as defined in Lariviere and Porteus 2001) or a generalized version of a condition studied in 
Ziya et al. (2004); for the exponential demand function, the condition is very general and includes all 
distributions for which generalized failure rate is monotone; and for the isoelastic demand function, no 
condition is needed on the distribution. The results on the first two cases provide a significant 
generalization over Granot and Yin (2008, see Table 3) who, for the analogous models with wholesale 
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price-only contracts, established unimodality of the manufacturer’s expected profit function under the 
restriction that ( )fε ε is increasing in ε , where ( )f ε  represents the probability density function of 
[ , ]A Bε ∈  with  and 0A ≥ B < ∞ .  
Apparently, one distribution that satisfies the above condition of Proposition 2 in Granot  and Yin 
(2008) is the beta distribution with restricted values ( 1≤ ) for one of its two parameters that include the 
power and uniform distributions. These distributions have bounded support. Note that other commonly 
used distributions, such as gamma, Weibull, normal, lognormal, Pareto, etc., do not usually satisfy the 
condition “ ( )fε ε is increasing inε ”, unless, as the authors mentioned, the domain of ε  is relatively 
small. However, the market demand or the optimal stocking level may not always correspond to the 
values of ε  in this small domain. In this paper, for both linear and exponential demand functions with 
multiplicative model, we are able to generalize Granot and Yin (2008)’s result on the unimodality of the 
manufacturer’s expected profit function for classes of distributions that include all IGFR distributions 
which, as noted by Lariviere and Porteus (2001), include most of the common distributions. We also 
provide the example of a DGFR distribution (defined in Lariviere 2006) for which our unimodality 
results will apply. The condition for the case of exponential demand function is even weaker than 
requiring that the generalized failure rate is monotone; hence all IGFR and DGFR distributions will 
satisfy this condition. Such generalizations make the price postponement model more viable to use, 
since under unimodality, both the optimal w and Q are unique and can be expressed in simple analytical 
forms that are easily computable, as can be seen from our propositions. 
Similar to the multiplicative demand model, the case of additive model also continues to interest 
the researchers. However, no result is available for this model under the wholesale price-only contract 
and is recognized to be a difficult case in the literature (Wang et al. 2004, Granot and Yin 2008 and 
Song et al. 2008). For the linear demand function, here we prove the unimodality of the manufacturer’s 
and retailer’s expected profit functions and derive the unique optimal wholesale price and retail order 
quantity for IFR demand distributions. We also provide counter-examples to show how the unimodality 
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of the manufacturer’s expected profit function may fail for some DFR distributions that are IGFR. Note 
that we do not consider the cases of exponential and isoelastic functions because they are not 
meaningful when the demand model is additive (Petruzzi and Dada 2002). 
Finally, we compare the optimal policies for the four models we study here to gain insights into the 
structures of the solutions and their implications. In particular, we explore why, to establish the 
unimodality of the manufacturer’s expected profit function, different sufficient conditions on the 
distributions are needed for different demand models.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. The 
analysis of both multiplicative and additive demand models and insights into their solutions are 
provided in Section 3. Proofs of all the results are included in the Appendix. 
 
2.   Model Description 
We consider the multiplicative and additive demand models for the form ( )X D p u= ⋅ and 
( )X D p u= +  respectively, where ( )D p  is the deterministic part of demand X that decreases in the retail 
price p, and u is the random part of X with a support on , where .   ( , )A B 0,A B≥ ≤ ∞
The events, contract and cost parameters in our model occur in the following sequence. A 
manufacturer with unlimited capacity produces items at a cost of c per unit and acting as a Stackelberg 
leader offers to charge a per unit wholesale price w from a retailer. The retailer then decides his optimal 
order quantity Q for the selling season. Subsequently, the demand is realized. Based on the demand 
realization, retailer chooses his retail price p that maximizes his profit. For simplicity, we assume that 
the salvage value of any unsold inventory is zero and that any unsatisfied demand is lost without any 
shortage penalty. To avoid trivial solutions, we let .c w p< <  Note that, the analysis of our results 
would not change if we allow for positive salvage value and shortage penalty. 
For the convenience of analysis, let ( )F u and ( )f u respectively denote the distribution and density 
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functions of u, the random component of the demand. To avoid technicalities, unless stated otherwise, 
we will assume the following:                                                                                   
Assumption 1. The probability density function ( )f u exists and is differentiable. 






=  and the generalized 
failure rate of u as ( ) ( )g hξ ξ ξ= . To clearly specify the probability distributions to be used in our 
analysis, let us now define the following classes of distributions: 
Definition 1. (Ross 1996) The random variable u is said to have an increasing failure rate (IFR) 
distribution if ( )h ξ is non-decreasing in ( , and a decreasing failure rate (DFR) distribution if )A B
( )h ξ is non-increasing in ( , )A B .  
Definition 2. (Lariviere and Porteus 2001, Lariviere 2006) The random variable u is said to have an 
increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) distribution if ( )g ξ is non-decreasing in ( , )A B and a 
decreasing generalized failure rate (DGFR) distribution if ( )g ξ is non-increasing in ( , .  )A B
Most common distributions are IGFR (Lariviere and Porteus 2001). IFR is a large subset of IGFR 
and includes normal, truncated normal, uniform, gamma with shape parameter , Weibull with shape 
parameter , etc. (Porteus 2002). Examples of DFR distributions are gamma and Weibull with shape 





Finally, we write the profit functions of the channel members. In our decentralized system with the 
wholesale price-only contract, the retailer’s expected profit function is given by  
( , ) [ min( , )] ,R p Q E p Q X wQΠ = −          
and the manufacturer’s expected profit function is given by  
( , ) ( )M w Q w c QΠ = − .                                                                




3.   The Analysis, Results and Insights  
In this section, we derive our results for the price-postponement model with wholesale price-only 
contracts. The linear, exponential and isoelastic demand functions for the multiplicative model and the 
linear demand function for the additive model are discussed in the following three subsections.   
3.1   The Multiplicative Demand Model 
For the multiplicative demand model ( )X D p u= ⋅ , we show that when the demand function is linear, 
that is, , the manufacturer’s profit function is unimodal in the retailer’s order quantity for 
IGFR demand distributions as well as for demand distributions satisfying another very general condition 
which holds for most of the common distributions. Next, we establish unimodality of the profit 
functions and derive unique optimal solutions respectively for the exponential demand function under a 
very mild condition on the generalized failure rate of u and for the isoelastic demand function under no 
condition on the distribution of u. To proceed, we start with the linear demand function.  
ppD −= 1)(
The Case of Linear Demand Function 
When , by Lemma 1 of Granot and Yin (2008), we know that the optimal retail price is 
given by   
ppD −=1)(
* ˆ1/ 2         if 2
ˆ ˆ1 /   if 2
u Q
p
Q u u Q
≤⎧
= ⎨ − ≥⎩ ,
                                                                                                                 (1) 
where  is the realized value of u, the random part of the demand. Also, from (13) and (14) of Granot 
and Yin (2008), the retailer’s optimal order quantity Q is given by  
û
2
( )(2 ) 2
B
Q
f uw F Q Q du
u
= − ∫ ,         
and the manufacturer’s expected profit function is given by  
2
( )( ) ( ) (2 ) 2 .
B
M Q
f uQ w c Q F Q Q du c Q
u
⎡Π = − = − −⎢⎣ ⎦∫
⎤
⎥                                                                       (2)    
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While the concavity of the retailer’s expected profit function has been established in Lemma 2 of 
Granot and Yin (2008) for general demand distributions, the unimodality of the manufacturer’s expected 
profit function  and the existence of unique optimal solutions have only been established for 
demands for which uf(u) is increasing in 
( )M QΠ
[ , ]u A B∈  (see their Proposition 2). We significantly 
generalize this later result in the following proposition. By suitably analyzing the behaviors of the first, 
second and third derivatives of  and their limits as ( )M QΠ 0Q
+→  and  , we show that Q →+∞
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, the manufacturer’s expected profit function  is unimodal 
in Q if the distribution of u is either     
( )M QΠ






QQf , as a function of Q, changes sign at most once.  
Therefore, the optimal order quantity of the retailer and the optimal wholesale price of the 





( )(2 ) 4
B
Q
f uc F Q Q du
u
= − ∫   and  *
1 (2 )
2
w c F Q*⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ .                                                               (3) 
The first condition (IGFR) is the same as that of Condition C3 in Ziya et al. (2004, Proposition 4.1). 
The second condition is a generalization of Condition C2 in Ziya et al., where their C2 is equivalent to 





QQf  (which is a sub-case of our condition (ii), see the proof of 
Proposition 1 in the Appendix). To see how general the condition (ii) is, consider the counter-example 
given in Section 6 of Ziya et al. (2004) with the probability distribution 2( ) 1 ( )F x x v −= − − , 
, , which satisfies neither their Condition C2 nor C3 (IGFR); however, this 
distribution satisfies our case 2b) that  






QQf  and moreover it’s a DGFR distribution. For 
this distribution, by our Proposition 1, the manufacturer’s expected profit function is unimodal in Q.  
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Further note that, as also mentioned in Lariviere and Porteus (2001), Condition C2 can fail for 
many common distributions, such as exponential, normal and Gamma distributions for which Condition 













 changes sign at most once.  This shows our condition (ii) is a significant generalization of 
Condition C2.   
Ziya et al. (2004) have pointed out that neither of their Condition C2 nor C3 is more restrictive than 
the other. The same is also true with our conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1. While we could not 
prove whether condition (ii) is more general than the IGFR condition (i), it is worth noting that our 
condition (ii) is satisfied by the long list of distributions provided in Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), 
which includes the commonly used log-concave and log-convex densities. If we let  be the class of 
probability distributions that satisfies either condition (i) or condition (ii) of Proposition 1, then it is 
evident that, with our previous example of the DGFR distribution, the class  is strictly bigger than the 
class of all IGFR distributions. Thus, Proposition 1 establishes the unimodality of the manufacturer’s 
expected profit function and provides the unique optimal solutions for a wide class of distributions.     
1S
1S
The Case of Exponential Demand Function 
When , the optimal retail price is given by (a derivation is shown in the Appendix)  pepD −=)(
( )
*
ˆl                     if 
ˆ ˆln /        if ,
u eQ
p
u Q u eQ
≤⎧⎪= ⎨ ≥⎪⎩
                                                                                                              (4)          
where  is the realization of u and “ln” represents the natural logarithm.  û





( ) [ min( , )]
[1 ] ( ) [(ln ln ) ] ( )






Q E p Q X wQ
Qe u f u du u Q u f u du wQ
u




= ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ −
= + ⋅ − ⋅
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ −
                                             (5)               
Subsequently, from (5), the first order condition 0Rd
dQ
Π
=  gives the optimal wholesale price w as 
 ln ( ) [ln 1] ( )
B
eQ
w u f u du Q F e= ⋅ − +∫ Q .                                                                                               (6) 
Therefore, the expected profit function of the manufacturer is given by 
( ) ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) .
B
M eQ
Q w c Q u f u du eQ F eQ c Q⎡Π = − = ⋅ − ⋅ −⎢⎣∫
⎤
⎥⎦
                                                         (7)       
Now, by analyzing the first and second derivatives of  and their limits as ( )M QΠ 0Q
+→  and  
, we prove that Q →+∞
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, (i) The retailer’s expected profit function is strictly concave in Q, 
and (ii) The manufacturer’s expected profit function  is unimodal in Q if the distribution of u 







− , as a function of Q, changes sign at most once.   
Therefore, the optimal order quantity of the retailer and the optimal wholesale price of the 
manufacturer are unique and given by     
*Q *w
*
*ln . ( ) [2 ln ] ( )
B
eQ
c u f u du Q F e= − +∫ *Q   and  * (w c F eQ= + *) .                                                      (8) 
 
Once again, the above result overcomes the restriction of “uf(u) is increasing in u” in Granot and 





 is monotone. Let  be 





distributions. Thus, by Proposition 2, for the distribution , , 
, which is DGFR, the manufacturer’s expected profit function is unimodal in Q and the 
optimal solutions are uniquely obtained from (8).  
2( ) 1 ( )F x x v −= − − [1 , )x v∈ + +∞
*Q  
0 v< < ∞
(* ˆ /p u=
û
The Case of Isoelastic Demand Function 
For the isoelastic demand function , 1 , the optimal retail price is given by   qppD −=)( >q
)1/qQ ,                                                                                                                                        (9) 
where  is the realized value of u. The following general result is shown in Granot and Yin (2008). A 
proof is included in the Appendix for facilitating some of our explanations in subsection 3.3.  
Proposition 3. For any distribution of u, the expected profit functions of both the manufacturer and 
retailer are strictly concave in the retailer’s order quantity Q. Therefore, the optimal order quantity 






− ) ( )
Bq q
A
c Q u f u du
−





qcw .                                                                     (10) 
From the proof we can observe that Proposition 3 holds even for discrete distributions, but with a 
continuous decision variable Q. The underlying reason will be explained in subsection 3.3. Now that we 
have analyzed the multiplicative demand model, we discuss the case of additive demand model next.   
3.2   The Additive Demand Model 
We now analyze the additive demand model ( )X D p u= + . While an interest in the additive demand 
case is always shown in the literature (e.g., Wang et al. 2004, Granot and Yin 2008, Song et al. 2008), 
no detail discussion or preliminary results are available for this model under the wholesale price-only 
contract.  Here, for the linear demand function, with IFR demand distributions, we show that the 
retailer’s expected profit function is strictly concave and the manufacturer’s expected profit function is 
unimodal in the retail order quantity. Subsequently, we derive the unique optimal wholesale price of the 
manufacturer, and the optimal order quantity and price of the retailer. Note that, as discussed in Petruzzi 
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and Dada (2002), if one considers the exponential and isoelastic demand functions for the additive 
model, then demand even when 0X > p →∞  if the realized , so that infinite profit is possible. 
Therefore, we do not analyze these cases since they are not natural models for demand.    
0u >
The Case of Linear Demand Function 








          if  1
2






⎪ + − −⎩
                                                                                                              (11)                            
where  is the realized value of u . û
Then, the expected profit of the retailer is given by  




u uQ f u Q du wQ
− + +⎡ ⎤Π = ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫2 1(1u du − + Q f u − .                                               (12) 
From (12), solving the first order condition 0Rd
dQ
Π , we get the optimal wholesale price w as              =
2 1
(1 ) ( ) 2 (2 1)
B
Q
w u f u du Q F Q −
−
= + − ⋅∫ .                                                                                                (13) 
Thus, the manufacturer’s expected profit function is given by  
2 1




Q w c Q u f u F Q c
−




(1 ) ( ) 4 (2
BM
Q
d u f u du QF Q
dQ −
Π
= + −∫ ,                                                                                      (15) 
and 
2
2 4 (2 1) 4 (2 1)
2 (2 1)2 (2 1) 2
(2 1)
(2 1) (2 1) (2 1)2 (2 1) 2 .
(2 1) (2 1)
(16)




Q f Q f QF Q
F Q F Q
Π
= − − −
⎡ ⎤−
= − −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − −




With these, we establish the following result: 
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, (i) The retailer’s expected profit function is strictly concave in Q, 
and (ii) The manufacturer’s expected profit function ( )M QΠ  is unimodal in Q if the distribution of u is 
IFR. Therefore, the optimal order quantity of the retailer and the optimal wholesale price of the 





(1 ) ( ) 4 (2 1)
B
Q
c u f u du Q F Q
−
= + − −∫    and   * * *2 (2 1w c Q F Q )= + − .                                          (17) 
 
Note that, unlike Proposition 1, we cannot relax the assumption of IFR distribution on u to IGFR 
distribution. The reason is that IGFR distributions also include DFR distributions (Lariviere 2006); and 
if that is the case, then in (2 1) (2 1) (2 1) 2
(2 1) (2 1)
Q f Q f Q
F Q F Q
⎡ ⎤− − −
+ −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦













 is non-increasing in Q, so that the monotonicity of  
(2 1) (2 1) (2 1) 2
(2 1) (2 1)
Q f Q f Q




+ −⎢ − −⎣ ⎦





Π  is not guaranteed. Subsequently, Md
dQ
Π  may 
have multiple zeroes. We actually observe these behaviors for some gamma and Weibull distributions 
with shape parameter < 1, for which these distributions are both DFR as well as IGFR. For the gamma 
distribution with shape parameter 2/3 and scale parameter 0.6, with the manufacturer’s production cost c 
= 0.12, we plot the graphs of Md
dQ





Π  in Figures 1a-1b and 2a-2b, respectively (shown in the 
Appendix). From Figures 1a and 1b, we observe that, in the interval [0.495, 0.540] for Q, Md
dQ
Π  has 
three zeroes, namely, 0.4978, 0.5011 and 0.5320. Moreover, from Figures 2a and 2b, we observe that, in 





Π  is not monotone. Very similar behaviors are also observed for the Weibull 
distribution with shape parameter 0.8 and scale parameter 1, and with the manufacturer’s production 
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cost c = 0.138. For this case, in the interval [0.498, 0.508] for Q, Md
dQ
Π  has three zeroes at 0.4987, 
0.5038 and 0.5072. A detailed explanation for these behaviors of multiple zeroes for Md
dQ






Π  is provided in the Appendix. These examples show that Proposition 4 does not 
hold for some DFR distributions that are also IGFR. Therefore, we preclude establishing unimodality of 
for all IGFR distributions and restrict our results in Proposition 4 to IFR distributions.   ( )M QΠ
3.3   Insights and Conclusions 
We now compare the results for the above four models to garner some insights. Let us first consider the 
cases of linear and exponential demand functions for the multiplicative model. From (1) and (4) we 
observe that the optimal retail price in both cases has similar structure, namely, for relatively high 
realizations of the random component of the demand (i.e., and , respectively for linear 
and exponential demand functions), the retailer charges the price that clears the market so that there is 
no unsatisfied demand. On the other hand, for relatively low realizations of u (i.e., and 
ˆ 2u Q≥ û eQ≥
ˆ 2u Q≤ û eQ≤ , 
respectively), the retailer charges the price at which his profit achieves the maximum value. For both 
demand functions, it’s a constant price (1/2 and 1, respectively) and the retailer may have some unsold 
stock. While the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale prices also have similar structure for both these 
demand functions (see (3) and (8)), the structures of the retailer’s optimal order quantities are slightly 
different and it is primarily due to the specific form of the corresponding demand function. For the 
isoelastic demand function with multiplicative model, the structures of the solutions are quite different. 
The optimal retail price in this case has a unique form for all values of the realization  (see (9)). This 
allows the manufacturer’s wholesale price to be initially written in terms of a moment of the distribution 
(see (32)) which, consequently, after substituting out the expression for the optimal order quantity, leads 
to a distribution-free expression for the optimal wholesale price. Moreover, notice from (10) that the 




of the optimal solutions lead to the unimodality of the manufacturer’s profit function for all distributions, 
both continuous as well as discrete. On the other hand, for the linear and exponential demand functions, 
the optimal retail prices change from a constant value to an increasing function of , once  exceeds 




(2 )F Q  and ( )F eQ , respectively (see (3) and (8)), which, subsequently, prompt us to find 
the regularity conditions that will lead to the unimodality of the manufacturer’s expected profit function. 
Such exploration results in sufficient conditions based on the generalized failure rate of the distributions, 
as we observe in Propositions 1 and 2 (except condition (ii) of Proposition 1 that come from studying 
the regularity properties of the second and third derivatives of the manufacturer’s expected profit 
function).  
Next, for the additive model with linear demand function, from (11) we observe that the optimal 
retail price for relatively high realizations of u (i.e., ) is the price that clears the market. And 
for relatively low realizations of u (i.e., u
ˆ 2u Q≥ −
1
1
ˆ 2Q≤ − ), the retailer charges the price that maximizes his 
profit. Notice that this price is 
ˆ1
2
u+  which depends on the realized value of u and is not a constant as 
was the case for the multiplicative model with linear demand function. This sensitivity of the optimal 
retail price for lower values of the realization of u influences the wholesale price (see (12) and (13)) in 
such a way that it can lead to non-monotonicity for the second derivative and multiple optima for the 
manufacturer’s expected profit function if the distribution is DFR, as illustrated with two examples in 
the previous subsection. From the explanation provided in the Appendix, we observe that one of the 
reasons for the above non-monotonicity and multi-modality is the sharp change in the density function 
for smaller values of u when its distribution is DFR (see Johnson et al. 2004, p. 341 and 631, 
respectively for the gamma and Weibull densities with shape parameter < 1). For this reason, to 




Finally, let us compare the optimal retail prices between the multiplicative and additive demand 
models. When the realizations of u are relatively high so that the retailer charges the market clearing 
prices, the optimal retail prices for all three multiplicative demand models are expressed as a function of 
the ratio between and Q, whereas for the additive model it is expressed as a function of the difference 
between and Q. Clearly, these forms come directly from the multiplicative or additive structure of the 
model itself. However, when the realizations of u are relatively low in which case the retailer charges 
the price that maximizes his profit, the characteristics of the optimal retail prices are quite different 
between the multiplicative and additive demand models. For the multiplicative model with linear 





u+  which can take any value between (1/2, Q) since can vary between 0 and  2  in this case. 
This shows that not only the values of the optimal retail prices differ between the multiplicative and 
additive demand models, but also their structures are different. Consequently, this creates some 
structural differences in the optimal solutions and   between these two models (see (3) and (17)) 
as a result of which we get different sufficient conditions on the distributions to guarantee the 





To conclude, here we have studied the price-postponement model for a newsvendor problem with 
wholesale price-only contract. For both multiplicative and additive demand models, we have shown that 
the optimal policies and expected profit functions of the manufacturer and retailer are well-behaved 
under reasonably mild conditions on the demand distribution. Extension of this research to the no-
postponement model in which the optimal retail price is also decided before the realization of demand 
eludes us at the moment. While a complete set of results for this model under buyback contracts is 
provided in Song et al. (2008) and Granot and Yin (2008) for the multiplicative demand case, the 
corresponding results under the wholesale price-only contract do not follow from there and most 





Proof of Proposition 1. 
In (2), we have the manufacturer’s expected profit function as  
2
( )( ) (2 ) 2
B
M Q
f uQ F Q Q du c
u
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so that the first derivative of  is given by  MΠ
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( ) 1 ( ) 14 4 ( ) 4 | ( )
(2 ) ( )4
2







f u F uQ du Q dF u Q F u d
u u u
F Q F uQ d
Q u





− = = −⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤






           
which implies that  
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, and the first derivative of  equals  )(QL
2 2 2
( ) (2 ) (2 ) (2 ) 2 (2 ) 1 .
2 2 2 (2 ) (2
dL Q F Q f Q c F Q Q f Q c
dQ Q Q Q Q F Q F Q)
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Notice that in (19), 
)2( QF




QfQ ⋅  is also non-decreasing in Q. Moreover,  
0
2 (2 )lim 1 0 1 1 0
(2 ) (2 )Q
Q f Q c c p
F Q F Q+→
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+ − = + − < −⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
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2 (2 )lim 1 1 0
(2 ) (2 )Q
Q f Q c
F Q F Q→+∞
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which means that 
dQ
QdL )(  changes sign only once, from negative to positive.    
Now, note that  
0 0
| lim 2 ( ) 1M
Q Q
d Q L Q c
dQ + +→ →
Π







M ,                                                                                           (21) 
which implies that and Since (0) 0L > ( ) 0L +∞ < .
dQ
QdL )(  changes sign only once from negative to 
positive,  changes sign exactly once from positive to negative, and so is )(QL
dQ
d MΠ .   Therefore, we 
can conclude that if the demand distribution is IGFR, then MΠ (Q) is unimodal and there exists a unique 
Q which maximizes (Q).   MΠ
Next, we will show that under condition (ii), MΠ (Q) is again unimodal.  
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And, the third derivative 3
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QQf  crosses the horizontal zero line (or changes sign) at most once 
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d M , respectively. Therefore, 2
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M ,  therefore, 
dQ
d MΠ changes sign exactly once in the domain.                                   
In case 2c), again from (26) we observe that  3
3
dQ
d MΠ  changes sign from negative to positive once in the 
20 
 
domain, so that 2
2
dQ
d MΠ  decreases initially and then increases.  Here we need to analyze three sub-cases: 






Q .  
Since, by (25), in case 2c) we have   
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d M  for all Q.  Therefore, using (20) and (21) it follows that 
dQ
d MΠ changes 













dQ f+ +→ → →





lim= ⋅ ,  and 









dQ f→+∞ →+∞ →+∞
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which implies that 2
2
dQ
d MΠ  decreases and crosses the horizontal zero line once (since 3
3
dQ
d MΠ  changes 












M ,  hence, 
dQ
d MΠ changes sign exactly once.  
In case 2d), similarly to case 2c) we can show that 
dQ
d MΠ changes sign exactly once.  
This completes the proof of the proposition.                                                                                                                         
 
Derivation of *p in Equation (4): 
When ,  with  as the realized value of u, and pepD −=)( û / (D ),z Q p= the retailer chooses his retail 
price p to maximize    
ˆ ˆmin{ , }( ) min{ , } pR p D p z u wQ pe wQ
−Π = ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅ −z u .    






,  that is, ( )ˆ ln ˆln / lnp u Q u≤ = Q− .  In this case,                              
R pQ wQ−Π = , which is increasing in p; as p increases, p
Q
−e





Qz p ˆ≥= − .  This implies that the optimal stocking factor  cannot be less than u . Hence, we only 
need to look for the optimal with .   
*z ˆ
*z uz ˆ≥
For ,  we have uz ˆ≥ u
e
Q
p , that is, ( )ˆ ˆln / ln lnp u Q Q≥ = −uˆ .  ≥−
Then, the profit of the retailer becomes  ˆpR pe u w
−Π = − Q
R
.   







,  which attains its local maximum at 
p = 1. Since  in this case, we haveQup lnˆln −≥ * ˆma n ln }p u Q−= .  Letting  1lnˆln =− Qu , we 
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Proof of Proposition 2. 
(i) From (5) we get 
1 ( ) ln ) ln( ) ( )
[ln 1] ( ) ln )




d e e eQ f eQ u f u du Q e f eQ
dQ
Q F eQ Q f eQ w
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1 1ln ( ) ( ) ln( ) ( ) ( ) 0,Rd e eQ f eQ F eQ e eQ f eQ F eQ
dQ Q Q
Π
= − ⋅ − + ⋅ <= −                   
that is, the retailer’s expected profit function is strictly concave in Q.    
(ii)  Taking derivative of the manufacturer’s expected profit function ( )M QΠ given in (7), we obtain 
1ln ( ) ln( ) ( ) ( )






d u f u du eQ F eQ c Q F eQ
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= ⋅ − + −
∫
∫
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Moreover,               
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1 ( )( ) 1 .
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Now, note that condition C in Proposition 2 corresponds to the following cases:    
(i) 




− ≥   for all Q;  
(ii)   




− <   for all Q;  
(iii) 
0




− <   and   




− > ; 
(iv)  
0




− >   and   




− < .   
According to (28) and (29), case (i) can be ruled out since by (30), MΠ  is convex and hence, its first 
derivative should be increasing.   






<  for all Q, so that MΠ  is strictly concave and hence, optimal Q is unique.  






 changes sign exactly once from negative to positive. Therefore, from (28) and 




 changes sign exactly once from positive to negative. Thus, optimal Q is 
unique. 
For case (iv), the argument is similar to that of case (iii) above.  
Therefore, we conclude that under condition C,  is unimodal in Q.   ( )M QΠ
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Now, from (27), the optimal  is obtained by solving  *Q
*
* *ln . ( ) [2 ln ] ( )
B
eQ
c u f u du Q F e= − +∫ Q ,  
and therefore, from (6), the optimal wholesale price is given by 
* * *ln ( ) [ln 1] ( ) ( )
B
eQ
w u f u du Q F eQ c F eQ= ⋅ − + = +∫ * .                                                                    
 
Derivation of *p in Equation (9): 
With  as the realized value of u, the retailer chooses his retail price p to maximize    û
wQuzpDpR −⋅⋅=Π }ˆ,min{)(
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Proof of Proposition 3. 
The retailer’s expected profit function is given by 
1/




u Q u f u du wQ Q u f u du wQ
Q u
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Hence, RΠ
~  is strictly concave in Q, and from (31), the optimal w is given by  
1/ 1/(1 1/ ) ( )
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A
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Therefore, the expected profit function of the manufacturer is  
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M A
w c Q q Q u f u du c Q−⎡ ⎤Π = − = − ⋅ ⋅ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ , 
so that          





1(1 1/ ) ( ) ( )
( 1) ( ) ,




d qq Q u f u du c Q u f u du
dQ q









                                    (33)     




( 1) ( ) 0
Bq qM
A
d q Q u f u du
dQ q
− −Π −= − ⋅ <∫ ,    
which implies that MΠ




( 1 ( )
Bq q
A
q u f u du
q
−
= ⋅∫ .    






qcw .                                        
Derivation of *p in Equation (11): 
When , the retailer’s profit with  as the realized value of is given by  ppD −=1)( û u
ˆ( ) min{1 , }R Q p p u Q wQΠ = ⋅ − + − .                                                                                                 
If , then  ˆ1Q p< − + u
( )R Q p Q wQΠ = ⋅ −
ˆ1
, which is increasing in p, so that the retailer is better-off to increase p until 
p u Q− + ≤ ,  that is,  ˆ1p u Q≥ + − ; this means the optimal p does not exist if .  ˆ1Q p< − + u
uTherefore, for the optimal p we consider . Then,  ˆ1Q p≥ − +
ˆ( ) (1 )R Q p p u wQΠ = ⋅ − + − ,     
which attains maximum at 
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2
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Proof of Proposition 4. 
(i) From (12) we get  
2 1
(1 ) ( ) 2 (2 1)
BR
Q
d u f u du Q F Q w
dQ −
Π
= + − ⋅ − −∫ ,                                                                                     
so that 
2




= − − < .   Hence, RΠ is strictly concave in Q.  
(ii) Since the support of u is ( , )A B , where we have, for 00,A ≥ 1 / 2Q≤ < ,  and (2 1) 0f Q − =






 is non-decreasing 






 is strictly increasing in Q. Moreover,   
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Π  changes sign only once, from negative to positive.  
Now, we look at Md
dQ
Π  in (15). Since the expectation of demand X is positive, we have that   
0 1
| (1 ) ( ) 0 1 ( ) 1 ( )
BM
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Thus, Md
dQ
Π  changes sign exactly once, from positive to negative.  Therefore, we can conclude that if 
the demand distribution is IFR, then MΠ (Q) is unimodal and there exists a unique  which 










Π  is not monotone: 
 
Consider the following gamma density function with shape parameter 2/3 and scale parameter 0.6, 






.   
Let the manufacturer’s production cost c = 0.12.   




 in the intervals [0.5, 0.54] and [0.495, 0.5] of Q, 






 in the intervals [0.5, 0.54] and [0.495, 0.5] of 
Q, respectively. We have made separate plots for and 0.5Q ≥ 0.5Q ≤ because of the following reason: 




 as piece-wise continuous with different expressions for 0 1Q / 2≤ ≤  and .  1 / 2Q ≥
Similar behaviors are also observed for the Weibull density function 
0.80.2( ) (0.8) uf u u e− −= ⋅ ⋅ , 








































 in the interval [0.495, 0.5] of Q (for gamma distribution).                                                    
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Π for DFR/IGFR 
(gamma & Weibull with shape parameter < 1) distributions:     
 
From (15) and (16) we have 
2 1
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d u f u du QF Q c
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Π
= + − −∫ − ,   
2
2 4 (2 1) 4 (2 1)
Md Qf Q F Q
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Π
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Now, for gamma and Weibull distributions, for 0 1 / 2Q≤ < , we have (2 1) 0f Q − =  and (2 1) 1F Q − = .   
Therefore, for 0 , 1 / 2Q≤ < 1 ( ) 4Md E u Q
dQ
Π
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0| 1 ( ) 1 ( )M Q
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d E u c
dQ =
Π
= − − < 0 , which implies that Md
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Π changes sign once in [0, 1/2] 






= − , as shown in Figure 2b. 
Next, for , 1 / 2Q >
2
2 4 (2 1) 4 (2 1)
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2
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Π  will be a very large positive number (see Figure 2a). 
This implies that Md
dQ
Π will increase dramatically and may become positive for  (see Figure 1a). 
Then as Q increases, 





Π will decrease and may become negative, as can be seen from Figure 2a; 
consequently, Md
dQ
Π  will also decrease and may become negative (see Figure 1a).  





Π can be non-monotone for some gamma 
distribution with shape parameter 0 1α< < . The same is also true for some Weibull distribution with 
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